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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
ing is not embraced within the proper intendment of the arbitra-
tion clauses. 208
Of course, if the arbitration clause expressly provides for such claims,
they will be allowed; but absent an express inclusion, the arbitral pro-
cess would be an unending one if such claims were permitted. If the
plaintiff were successful in bringing to arbitration such a dispute, there
would be little doubt that another proceeding would subsequently be
initiated by the prior defendant on the same grounds.
The second decision, Hull Dye & Print Works, Inc. v. Riegel Tex-
tile Corp.,209 involved an arbitration clause which stated, in part, that
[a]ny controversy arising under or in relation to the contract or any
modification thereof may be settled by arbitration or by suit in any
court having jurisdiction, as the Mill [Hull] shall direct. 210
On the basis of the clause, Riegel attempted to compel arbitration.
The court noted, however, that the phraseology employed in the arbi-
tration clause clearly indicated that only Hull was to have the option
of proceeding to arbitration or instituting litigation:
The clause.., is not a contract for arbitration of controversies but
rather a grant to Hull of a unilateral right to arbitrate. Neither
party is required to arbitrate.21 '
As noted at the outset, both Steinberg and Hull demonstrate the
importance of the arbitration clause itself. They should serve as re-
minders to the practitioner that careful analysis of the wording em-
ployed in the clauses will often be outcome-determinative.
CPLR 7501: Arbitration stayed without prejudice where notice of in-
tention to arbitrate did not specify the nature of the controversy.
CPLR 7501 provides for the specific enforcement of an agreement
to arbitrate "without regard to the justiciable character of the contro-
versy," thus precluding the court from passing upon the merits of the
dispute. An application to compel arbitration may be opposed on only
three grounds: (1) absence of a valid agreement to arbitrate; (2) non-
compliance with an agreement; (3) tolling of the state of limitations.212
Unless one of the above grounds is established, arbitration must be
ordered.
208 Id. at 59, 327 N.Y.S.2d at 248.
209 37 App. Div. 2d 946, 325 N.Y.S.2d 782 (Ist Dep't 1971) (per curiam).
210 Id. at 946, 325 N.Y.S.2d at 783.
211 Id.
212 H. WACHITELL, NEW YORK PRACriCE UNDER THE CPLR 370 (3d ed. 1970). See Greene
Steel & Wire Co. v. F.W. Hartmann & Co., 235 N.Y.S.2d 238 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1962),
aff'd, 20 App. Div. 2d 683, 247 N.Y.S.2d 1008 (2d Dep't), appeal dismissed, 14 N.Y.2d 688,
198 N.E2d 914, 249 N.Y.S.2d 886 (1964).
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SURVEY OF NEW YOK PRACTICE
In Lease Plan Fleet Corp. v. Johnson Transportation, Inc., 13 the
parties entered into a leasing agreement which provided for arbitration
of all controversies pertaining to the agreement. Thereafter, defendant
served a notice of intention to arbitrate which merely referred to "a
controversy arising out of an equipment lease contract" and specified
the date of the contract.214 Plaintiff contended that this notice was
defective in that it failed to state the specific nature of the dispute.2 15
The Supreme Court, Monroe County, agreed with the plaintiff and
enjoined the defendant from proceeding with arbitration, with leave
to serve a new notice properly describing the controversy to be arbi-
trated.2 16
Whether a dispute is covered by an arbitration agreement is an
issue determinable by a court.217 "[A] court must always inquire, when
a party wants to invoke its aid to force a reluctant party to the arbi-
tration table, whether the parties have agreed to arbitrate the particular
dispute. ' 218 Clearly, specification of the dispute is essential to determina-
tion of whether it is arbitrable. No person should be compelled to
arbitrate a particular issue unless he has contractually agreed that it
was to be arbitrable.
CPLR 7511(b)(1)(iii): Letter agreement on submissions held not to
limit the scope of a general arbitration clause, thereby permitting an
award for consequential damages.
CPLR 7511 enumerates the various grounds upon which an arbi-
tration award may be vacated. The broadest ground is a claim under
CPLR 7511(b)(1)(iii) that the arbitrator has exceeded his power.219
Decisional law has interpreted this basis for vacatur to mean that an
arbitrator exceeds his power "only if [he gives] a completely irrational
construction of the provisions in dispute and in effect [makes] a new
contract for the parties." 220 The scope of the arbitrator's power has
213 67 Misc. 2d 822, 324 N.Y.S2d 928 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1971) (mem.).
214 Id., 324 N.Y.S.2d at 929.
215 Id.
216 Id. at 823, 324 N.Y.S.2d at 930, citing Nager Elec. Co. v. Weisman Constr. Corp.,
29 App. Div. 2d 939, 289 N.Y.S.2d 473 (1st Dep't 1968) (mem.).
217 Mohawk Maintenance Co. v. Drake, 53 Misc. 2d 272, 278 N.Y.S.2d 297 (Sup. Ct.
Queens County 1967), discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 42 Sr. JoHN's L. REV. 283, 310
(1967).
218 United Steel Workers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 570-71 (1960), quoted
in In re Carey, 11 N.Y.2d 452, 456, 184 N.E2d 298, 300, 230 N.Y.2d 703, 705 (1962) (per
curiam).
219 It is well settled that arbitrators must act within any limits imposed by the ar-
bitration agreement which is the foundation of their authority and jurisdiction. 8 WK&M
7511.18.
220 National Cash Register Co. v. Wilson, 8 N.Y,2d 377, 383, 171 NXE.2d 302, 305, 208
N.YS.2d 951, 955 (1960) (emphasizing the immense power of interpretation given to the
aribtrator).
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